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Abstract 
The problem of designing an integrated control and diagnostic module is considered. The four 
degree of freedom controller is recast into a general framework wherein results from optimal and 
robust control theory can be easily implemented. For the case of an 'If2 objective, it is shown that 
the optimal control-diagnostic module involves constructing an optimal controller, closing the loop 
with this controller, and then designing an optimal diagnostic module for the closed loop. When 
uncertain plants are involved, this two-step method does not lead to reasonable diagnostics, and 
the control and diagnostic modules must be synthesized simultaneously. An example shows how 
this design can be accomplished with available methods. 
1. Introduction 
The problem of designing filters for the monitoring and detection of system faults has received 
considerable attention since the seminal work of Beard [2] and Jones [9]. The survey paper [14] 
provides an early summary of work in this area, and [7] provides a more recent account. Although 
the majority of results for model based fault detection are based solely upon nominal models, a 
few significant studies which incorporate uncertain models have appeared [8, 10, 31. However, the 
methods developed in these references are unable to incorporate the norm bounded uncertainty 
descriptions commonly employed in control synthesis. In addition, for feedback systems, these 
methods do not consider the interaction between detection and control, i.e. the detection algorithms 
consider the effect of known inputs on the outputs, but do not consider the effect of the output on 
the input. 
Nett ill] introduced the four degree of freedom, or four parameter, controller which integrates 
control and diagnostics. By parameterizing all stabilizing controllers of this form, he was able to 
elucidate tradeoffs involving both controller performance and diagnostic performance. In addition 
to diagnostic tradeoffs such as between the detection of sensor and actuator faults, Nett et al. [12] 
have shown that when uncertain models are used, control performance must be traded off against 
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diagnostic performance. This work suggests that both control and diagnostic modules must be 
designed together. 
Although several years have passed since Nett parameterized the four degree of freedom con- 
troller, it has not found widespread use due to  the fact that a systematic synthesis method which 
guarantees robust control and diagnostic performance in the face of uncertainty does not exist. 
Notable attempts a t  outlining synthesis methods can be found in [12] and [6]. The former proposes 
a four step procedure in which each degree of freedom is considered successively. The latter employs 
a method which first designs a nominal control module with robust stability in an 1, framework, 
and then designs the diagnostic module on the resultant closed loop. 
In this paper, we show how the four degree of freedom controller is simply a special case of 
the general interconnection structure used in modern control synthesis methods. Viewed in this 
framework, we employ results from 'Ti2-, 7-1,-, and p-synthesis methods to  the design of integrated 
control and diagnostic systems. Through an example, we show that for uncertain systems, ro- 
bust performance of both control and diagnostics requires that these two modules be designed 
simultaneously. 
2. Four Degree of Freedom Controller 
Consider a general multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) system G. Partition the inputs to  G into 
uncontrolled inputs d, and controlled inputs u. The signal d represents noises, disturbances, and 
faults. Also partition the outputs as those outputs used by the control algorithm (y)  from those 
not used ( z ) ,  yielding the following partition for G: 
The four degree of freedom controller has access to  a reference signal r as well as the measurement 
y, and returns not only the control moves u, but also a diagnostic alarm signal a: 
Let the input d be described by d = [fT, nTIT, where f represents faults, and n represents noises 
and disturbances which occur under normal operation. Nett et al. (121 have elucidated several 
algebraic tradeoffs involved with fault detection which we will not repeat, except to  comment that 
in general, one must tradeoff the ability to  detect input or actuator faults from output or sensor 
faults . 
Of more interest for our discussion is the tradeoff between diagnostics and control. For example, 
consider the block diagram shown in Figure 1. Suppose we desire that the alarm signal a tracks 
input faults f;. The alarm signal a is given by 
a = Tarr + Tato ( f o  .+ no + G22( fi + 72;))  
where the perturbed transfer functions Tar and Tato are given by 
and So = (I - G K ~ ~ ) - '  is the output sensitivity function. For nominal systems, K can easily be 
designed so that TaT = 0 [I l l ;  however, as the above expression for this transfer function suggests, 
model uncertainty prohibits such a design, and the objective of making TaT robustly small will 
compete with disturbance rejection and reference tracking objectives. 
Figure 1: Control and diagnostic configuration for uncertain system. 
3. General Framework 
Figure 2: Equivalent four parameter controller configurations. 
Consider the plant and four parameter controller as in (1) and (2). As written, the reference 
signal r is not an input to  G, and the output alarm a is not an output of G. We would like to  obtain 
a reconfigured system G so that all the inputs are inputs to G, all the outputs are outputs of G, 
and the closed loop systems are equivalent, as shown in Figure 2. This can easily be accomplished 
with the following augmented plant: 
We may therefore view the four degree of freedom controller as a special case of the more general 
interconnection input-output system. Several advantages arise by viewing the control-diagnostic 
system in this Light. First, the parameterization of stabilizing controllers can be viewed as a simple 
application of the Youla parameterization, as shown in Section 4. Second, optimal control results, 
such as those found in [5], may be applied in a straightforward way. Finally, robust analysis and 
synthesis of the control-diagnostic module may be carried out in a systematic fashion using readily 
available tools such as those available in [I]. 
4. Ftecsnciliation between Four-Parameter Parameterization and 
Youla Parameterization 
By using the augmented G ,  the parameterization of stabilizing controllers is a straightforward 
application of the Youla parameterization. In order to  analyze stability, we need only consider the 
bottom right partition of G, 
,- Y 
Suppose a doubly coprime factorization of Ga2 is given by 
where 
Then a doubly coprime factorization of G~~ is given by 
I 0  
M'= 0 MG 1 '  M € {D, v, D, P]. 
The parameterization of all stabilizing controllers can be found in [13] and is given by: 
where Q is any stable transfer function. By partitioning Q and substituting the coprime factor- 
ization of G~~ given in (7) into (a), K can be parameterized in terms of the factorization of Gz2, 
resulting in 
where 
Using algebraic manipulations and properties of the doubly coprime factorization, one can show 
in which case I! has the same form as in Ell]. 
5.  7-i2 Optimal Control and Diagnostics 
In this section, we consider the problem of designing an 3-12 optimal controller which provides a 
nominally small output and also tracks faults. Let d = [fT, nT, yTIT, and y = [yT, yTIT. Let the 
T T transfer function which maps [d , u ] onto [zT, yT] be given by: 
The following assumptions simplify the analysis, and relaxing these assumptions do not change the 
nature of the results: 
Assumption 1 implies that the objective function has no cross terms of the form < x,  u >, where x 
represents the system states. Assumption 2 can easily be relaxed by introducing scaling matrices. 
Note that the common assumption BcsDz21 = 0 is not meaningful since the signal r is directly 
measured. 
For example, if the alarm signal should track actuator faults, then an appropriate choice of the 
signal zd may be Wg;:) 1 .  By combining the two systems to obtain the objective output 
A general diagnostic objective function is taken as the output of the following transfer function 
which takes d and a to  zd: 
(zT, z:lT, the following interconnection structure is obtained: 
Ad 
Cdl 
where the inputs are partitioned such that B1 multiplies [f T, nT, rTIT and B2 multiplies [aT, uTIT. 
The system matrices for G are given by: 
Bdl Bd2 
0 Dd12 (12) 
6 2  = [ Cc2 0 ] , ~ 2 1  = Dc21. 
The 7-t2 optimal controller can be found in [5] and is given by 
where 
-L2 = ~ 6 ;  $ BIDG1, -F2 = BGX, 
and X and Y are the solutions to  the algebraic Riccati equations determined respectively by the 
Hamiltonian matrices H2 and J2: 
By partitioning X and Y in the obvious fashion and introducing the following matrices: 
the two Riccati equations can be written as the following coupled matrix equations: 
We see that the equations for Y are coupled only in one direction, i.e. Y12 depends upon Yll, 
but Yll can be found independently of Y12. In fact, none of the parameters for Yll depend upon 
the diagnostic terms, so Yll is the same solution that would be obtained if diagnostics were not 
considered. As for the X equations, the second is linear and homogeneous in X12, SO X12 = 0. This 
decouples the equations. F2 and L2 are then given by ' 
Thus, for systems whose interconnection structure can be described by (13), the optimal control 
module is independent of the optimal diagnostic module for the 7-12 optimal solution. Thus, when 
considering only a nominal model, the two step procedure of designing an optimal control module, 
calculating the closed loop system, and then designing the optimal diagnostic module is equivalent 
to  designing the optimal control and diagnostic module simultaneously. However, when uncertainty 
is considered, we will show by example that the two modules should be considered simultaneously. 
The key feature of the system (13) which allows for the control to  be designed independently 
of the diagnostic is that the alarm signal a does not affect the states associated with G,. This 
restriction is reasonable as its violation would imply that the overall objective included some cross- 
terms between the output and the alarm. For example, in a stochastic setting, assuming the form 
(13) would allow objective function terms of the form E(yTy) and E ((a - f)T(a - f ) ) ,  but not 
E ( yT(a - f )) , where E is the expectation operator. 
6. Robust Synthesis 
Viewing the integrated control-diagnostic problem as a simple case of the general interconnection 
framework as shown in Figure 2 allows the application of robust synthesis tools such as those in [I] 
in a straightforward fashion. In particular, a control-diagnostic module which guarantees robust 
performance may be synthesized using a two block p structure, and the DK iteration method. 
Consider a system with the structure shown in Figure 1. We would like t o  design a control- 
diagnostic module with the following properties: 
1. The output signal tracks reference commands and is insensitive to  actuator faults. 
2. The alarm signal is large only when a fault has occurred. 
3. Properties 1 and 2 hold in the presence of a bounded uncertainty. 
Let T, be the transfer function from [fT, nT, rTIT to y-r, Td be the transfer function from [fT, nT, rTIT 
to  a- f ,  and T, be the transfer function from [fT,  nT, rTIT to a. A mathematical statement of the 
design objective is formulated as follows: Find a stabilizing K such that 
Including a weight on Ta is needed for the problem to be well posed. By introducing a full perfor- 
mance block Ap, this problem can be stated equivalently as: Find a stabilizing K such that 
where G is an appropriate interconnection structure which contains the weighting functions, and 
4 represents the lower linear fractional transformation. 
Now let us consider as a specific example a second order, two-input, two-output system with 
actuator faults and measurement noise, i.e. f =. f;, n = no, and f, = ni = 0. The frequency 
response for the nominal model is shown in Figure 3, and the system matrices are given by 
We assume an uncertainty of 10% in the gain of each input channel, and cover this model set 
by an input uncertainty, with W, = 0.11, A, = diag(Al, A,), where Al and A2 depict 1 x 1 
blocks, and llA,llNm 5 1. The performance weights VV,, Wd, and Wa are diagonal, with the same 
weight on each component, and the magnitudes of these weights are shown in Figure 4. Note that 
the performance objective is not very aggressive, namely, we desire steady state reference tracking 
within 10%. One would expect that this type of objective could be easily achieved. 
Two controllers were synthesized. Ebr the first controller, the DK iteration method was used 
to  simultaneously design the control and diagnostic modules, and a final value of p = 0.95 was 
achieved. We will refer to  this controller as the one-step controller. In the second case, a robust 
control module was designed without considering the diagnostic objective. The resulting controller 
was used to  close the loop. Synthesis of an 7-t, optimal diagnostic led to  a value of p = 12. Several 
iterations on the DK scheme resulted in p % 6.5. We describe the control-diagnostic module which 
achieves the latter p value as the two-step controller. 
For both the one-step and the two-step control-diagnostic modules, the output was simulated 
with A, = diag(0.1,-0.1). The input consisted of a ramp actuator fault in the first channel which 
rose from 0 to  1 between time 100 and 200, and a set point step change of -1 for the second 
output at time 10, as shown in Figure 5 .  The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6, which 
displays the plant output, and Figure 7, which shows the filtered alarm signal W d a .  
From the simulations, one can make the following observations. The two-step control-diagnostic 
module provides much better performance in regard to reference tracking; however, the diagnostics 
are inadequate. A large false alarm occurs at time 10 when the reference signal changes. The 
one-step module does not issue a false alarm, but experiences significantly deteriorated reference 
tracking performance. This suggests that robust control-diagnostic performance requires detuning 
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Figure 3: Frequency Response for plant. 
Figure 4: Performance Weights. 
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Figure 5: Fault in first actuator (dashed), and reference signal for second output (solid). All other 
inputs signals are zero. 
Figure 6: Plant Output for one-step and two-step controller designs. 
of the control action to  a much greater extent than would be expected when diagnostics are not 
considered. 
For the one-step system, the alarm signal is raised when the slope of the fault changes, but not 
during the constant slope section of the fault ramp. This is due to  the diagnostic weighting function 
Wd which annihilates low frequency behavior. For this example, it was not possible t o  achieve robust 
performance with a weighting with significant low frequency energy. Roughly speaking, the facts 
that a signal W,A,u enters the system in the same way as the fault f and that in steady state u 
must change to  track r preclude the possibility of robust control and detection in the low frequency 
range. 
The two-step controller achieves robust control performance, with p 0.1 for the first step of 
this synthesis; however, the resulting control action leads to poor diagnostics. This suggests that 
methods for optimal or robust diagnostics which do not explicitly consider control action, such as 
in [4], will not work well for uncertain plants. 
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Figure 7: Filtered alarm signal W d a  for one-step and two-step controller designs. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have shown how systems which integrate diagnostics and control can be designed 
using standard methods. For nominal models, 7 i 2  theory justifies designing the control and diag- 
nostic modules successively; however, uncertainty requires that the design be si~llultaneous since 
diagnostic objectives may limit achievable performance. 
An important question which we did not address in this study is the selection of performance 
measures for diagnostics. We considered the 'Hz norm for the nominal case, and the 'H, norm for 
the robust case primarily due to  the availability of methods to  address these problems. In choosing 
a performance measure for a diagnostic system, one should consider the detection algorithm which 
will be used to  determine when faults have occurred. 
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